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fits due from the surviving partners as constructive trustees, an
allowance ought to be made for the losses the firm had incurred. The whole transaction should be "adopted or repudiated."
It does not follow, however, that the estate of the cestui-quetrust should bear the same proportions of such losses as would
fall to the share of a partner entitled to an equal interest. It
has been shown that it is only in very rare instances that the
cestui-que-trust can recover a share of the profits equal to the
ratio which his interest bears to the capital of the firm, since
an allowance must be made in nearly every case as compensation to the partners for labor and skill. Hence, it would seem
only just to the cestui-que-trust to deduct the same fraction
from the losses of the firm before he is called upon to share
them. If, for example, an allowance of one-fifth of the total
profits were to be made as compensation for skill, and the
cestui-que-trust awarded four-fifths of the profits earned by the
use of his money, he should only be held liable for four-fifths
of the losses incurred. Therefore, in the statement of the account for a year in which there have been losses, a sum should
be deducted from the balance due to the trust estate at the
beginning of that year, exactly equivalent to the sum which
would have been added to the balance, if, instead of losses,
the year's operations had yielded profits to an equal amount.
RUSSELL DUANE.

United States Supreme Court.
IN RE RAHRER.
[Decided May 25th, 1891.]
The exclusive power of Congress over interstate and Foreign commerce
does not prevent a State from affecting the subject of commerce in the
exercise of her power of police legislation, provided such legislation does
not conflict with the will of Congress relative to the subjects of commerce.
The will of Congress is expressed in the course of legislation, and can be
determined by the Courts as well from what Congress his not done as from
positive laws.
The Act of August 8, 189o , declared in effect that State laws passed in
the exercise of the police powers of the State, though they affected intoxicating liquors which were the subjects of commerce, did not conflict with
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the will of Congress. This was nothing more than an authoritive interpretation by Congress of its own previous legislation, which interpretation,
not making the will of Congress conflict with the Constitution, will be
followed by this Court.
The laws of Kansas (i Gen. Stat. Kansas, c. 31, R 9, 380, 381, 386),
-which provide for the punishment of those who sell, or offer for sale, intoxicating liquors, can without conflict with the will of Congress as
expressed in its legislation, be applied to an importer who sold liquors
brought from other States in the packages in which he had imported them.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This was an appeal by the State of Kansas from the judgment of the United States Circuit Court for Kansas, granting
the petition of Charles A. Rahrer for a writ of habeas copus.
The facts were as follows:
In June, 189o, Maynard, Hopkins & Company, wholesale
liquor dealers, of Kansas City, Missouri, appointed Charles A.
Rahrer, the petitioner, as their agent in Topeka, Kansas, to sell
in the unbroken package of importation liquors shipped by
them from Kansas City, Missouri, to Topeka, Kansas.
In July, i89o, Maynard, Hopkins & Co., shipped to the
petitioner a car load of intoxicating liquors.
On the 9 th day of August, 1890, the petitioner, as agent for
Maynard, Hopkins & Company, offerred for sale and sold, in
the unbroken package of importation, one pony keg of beer;
also, one pint of whiskey.
The keg of beer-was separate and distinct from all other
kegs of beer, and was shipped as a separate and distinct package by Maynard, Hopkins & Company.
The same was true of the whiskey.
The petitioner was arrested by the Sheriff of Shawnee
County.
The Circuit Court for the District of Kansas, granted a writ
of Habeas Corpus and discharged the prisoner on the ground
that Rahrer was wrongfully restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States: 43 Fed. Rep.
556. Whereupon the case was brought to the Supreme Court
by appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE cASE.

The Constitution of Kansas provides: "The manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in
this State, except for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes:" i Gen. Stat. Kansas, 1889, p. 107. The sections ofthe
Kansas statutes claimed to have been violated by the petioner
are as follows:
"Any person or persons who shall manufacture, sell or
barter any spiritous or other intoxicating liquors shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished as hereinafter provided:
Provided, however, That such liquors may be sold for medical,
scientific and mechanical purposes, as provided in this Act."
"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to sell or
barter for medical, scientific or mechanical purposes, any malt,
vinous, spritous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors, without having first procured a druggist permit therefor from the
probate judge of the county wherein such druggist may be
doing business at the time, etc."
"Any person, without taking out and having a permit to sell
intoxicating liquors, as provided in this Act, or any person not
lawfully and in good faith engaged in the business of a druggist, who shall, directly or indirectly, sell or barter any spiritous. malt, vinous, fermented or other intoxicating liquors,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred
dollars or more than five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned
in the county jail riot less than thirty days nor more than ninety
days:" i Gen. Stat. Kansas, c. 31, §§ 380, 381, 386.
On April 28th, i89O, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided that "A statute of a State, prohibiting the sale
of any intoxicating liquors, except for pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical, or sacramental purposes, and under a license
from a county Court of fhe State, is, as applied to a sale by the
importer, and in original packages or kegs, unbroken and unopened, of such liquors manufactured in and brought from
another State, unconstitutional and void, as repugnant to the
clause of the Constitution granting to Congress the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States:" Leisy v. Har-din, 135 U. S. 100.
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On August 8th, 1890, an Act of Congress was approved,
usually known as "Wilson Bill," the text of which is as follows:
"That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors
or liquids transported into any State or Territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall,
upon arrival in such State or Territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in
the same manner as though such liquors or liquids had been
produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise:" 26 Stat. 313, c. 728.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MR. CHIEF, JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The power of the State to impose restraints and burdens
upon persons and property in conservation and promotion of
the public health, good order and prosperity, is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by
-them to the general government nor directly restrained by the
Constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive.
And this Court has uniformly recognized State legislation,
legitimately for police purposes, as not in the sense of the
Constitution necessarily infringing upon any right which has
been confided expressly or by implication to the National Government.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in forbidding a State to make
or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, or to deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or to deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, did not invest, and did not attempt to invest Congress
with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the
domain of State legislation.
As observed by Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion
of the Court in the Civil Rights Casts, 109 U. S. 3, 13, the
legislation under that amendment cannot properly cover the
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whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty, and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That
would be to establish a code of municipal law, regulative of all
private rights between man and man in society. It would be
to make Congress take the place of the State Legislatures and
to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm that because the
rights of life, liberty, and property (which include all civil
rights that men have) are by the amendment sought to be
protected against invasion on the part of the State without
due process of law, Congress may, therefore, provide due process of law, for their vindication in every case; and that,
because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws is prohibited by the amendment, therefore,
Congress may establish laws for their equal protection.
In short, it is not to be doubted that the power to make the
ordinary regulations of police remains with the individual
States, and cannot be assumed by the National Government,
and that in this respect it is not interfered with by the Fourteenth Amendment: Barbierv. Connolly, I13 U. S. 27, 31.
The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States, when the subjects of that power are national in
their nature, is also exclusive. The Constitution does not
provide that interstate commerce shall be free, but by the
grant of this exclusive power to regulate it, it was left free
except as Congress might impose restraint. Therefore, it has
been determined that the failure of Congress to exercise this
exclusive power in any case, is an expression of its will that
the subject shall be free from restrictions or impositions upon
it by the several States: Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District,120
U. S. 489. And if a law passed by a State in the exercise of
its acknowledged powers, comes into conflict with that will,
the Congress and the State cannot occupy the position of
equal opposing sovereignties, because the Constitution declares
its supremacy, and that of the laws passed in pursuance
thereof: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I, 21o. That which is
not supreme must yield to that which is supreme: Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 448.
" Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic," said Chief Justice
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Marshall, "but it is something more; it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations and
parts of nations in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Unquestionably, fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or
liquids are subjects of commercial intercourse, exchange, barter and traffic, between nation and nation, and between State
and State, like any other commodity in which a right of traffic
exists, and are so recognized by the usages of the commercial
world, the laws of Congress and the decisions of Courts.
Nevertheless, it has been often held that State legislation,
which prohibits the manufacture of spiritous, malt, vinous,
fermented, or other intoxicating liquors within the limits of a
State, to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage,
does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by the
amendments thereto: Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, and
cases cited. "These cases," in the language of the opinion in
fugler v. Kansas, p. 659, "rest upon the acknowledged right
of. the States of the Union to control their purely internal
affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the'health, morals and
safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere with
the execution of the powers of the general Government, or
violate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.
The power to establish such regulations, as was said in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I, 203, reaches everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the National Government."
But it was not thought, in that case, that the record presented
any question of the invalidity of State laws, because repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce among the Stat~s. It is
upon the theory of such repugnancy that the case before us
arises, and involves the distinction which exists between the
commercial power and the police power, which, "though quite
distinguishable when they do not approach each other, may
yet, like the intervening colors between white and black,
approach so nearly as to perplex the understanding, as colors
perplex the vision in marking the distinction b&tween them:"
12 Wheat. 441.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

And here the sagacious observations of Mr. Justice Catron,
in the Likense Cases, 5 How. 599, may profitably be quoted,
as they have often been before: "The law and the decision
apply equally to foreign and to domestic spirits as they must
do on the principles assumed in support of the law. The assumption is, that the police power was not touched by the
Constitution, but left to the States as the Constitution found it.
This is admitted; and whenever a thing from character or
condition, is of a description to be regulated by that power in
the State, then the regulation may be made by the State, and
Congress cannot interfere. But this must always depend on
facts, subject to legal ascertainment, so that the injured may
have redress. And the fact must find its support in this,
whether the prohibited article belongsto, and is subject to be
regulated as part of foreign commerce, or of commerce among
the States. If, from its nature, it does not belong to commerce,
or if its condition, from putrescence or other cause, is such
when it is about to enter the State that it no longer belongs to.
commerce, or, in other words, is not a commercial article, then
the State power may exclude its introduction. And as an
incident to this power, a State may use means to ascertain the
fact. And here is the limit between the sovereign power of
the State and the Federal power. That is to say, that which
does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the
police power of the State ; and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States. And to
this limit must all the general views come, as I suppose, that
were suggested in the reasoning of this Court in the cases of
Gibbons v. Ogden ; Brown v. The State of Mfaryland; and
New York v. Miln. What, then, is the assumption of the
State Court? Undoubtedly, in effect, that the State had the
power to declare what sh6uld be an article of lawful commerce
in the particular State; and, having declared that ardent spirits
and wines were deleterous to morals and health, they ceased
to be commercial commodities there, and that then the police
power attached, and consequently the powers of Congress
could not interfere. The exclusive State power is made to.
rest, not on the fact of the state or condition of the article,
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nor that it is property usually passing by sale from hand to
hand, but on the declaration found in the State laws and
asserted as the State policy, that it shall be excluded from
commerce. And by this means the sovereign jurisdiction in
the State is attempted to be created, in a case where it did not
previously exist. If this be the true construction of the Constitutional provision, then the paramount power of Congress
to regulate commerce is subject to a very material limitation ;
for it takes from Congress, and leaves with the States, the
power to determine the commodities, or articles of property,
which are the subjects of lawful commerce. Congress may
regulate, but the States determine what shall or shall not be
regulated. Upon this theory, the power torregulate commerce,
instead of being paramount over the subject, would become
subordinate to the State police power; for it is obvious that
the power to determine the articles which may be the subjects
of commerce, and thus to circumscribe its scope and operation,
is, in effect, the controlling one. The police power would not
only be a formidable rival, but, in a struggle, must necessarily
triumph over the commercial power, as the power to regulate
is dependent upon the power to fix and determine upon the
subjects to be regulated. The same process of legislation and
reasoning adopted by the State and its Courts could bring
within the police power any article of consumption that a State
might wish to exclude, whether it belonged to that which was
drank, or to food and clothing; and with nearly equal claims
to propriety, as malt liquors and the produce of fruits other
than grapes stand on no higher grounds than the light wines
of this and other countries, excluded in effect, by the law as it
now stands. And it would only be another step to regulate
real or supposed extravagance in food and clothing. And in
this connection it may be proper to say, that the three States
whose laws are now before us had in view an entire prohibition from use of spirits and wines of every description, and
that their main scope and object is to enforce exclusive temperance as a policy of State, under the belief that such a policy
will best subserve the interests of society, and that to this end,
more than to any other, has the sovereign power of these
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States been exerted; for it was admitted, on the argument,
that no licenses are issued, and that exclusion exists, so far as
the laws can produce the result-at least, in some of the Statesand that this was the policy of the law. For these reasons, I
think the case cannot depend on the reserved power in the
State to regulate its own police." And the learned Judge
reached the conclusion that the law of New Hampshire, which
particularly raised the question, might be sustained as a regulation of commerce, lawful, because not repugnant to any actual
exercise of the commercial power by Congress. In respect of
this the opposite view has since prevailed, but the argument
retains its force in its bearings upon the purview of the police
power as not concurrent with and necessarily not superior to
the commercial power.
The laws of Iowa under consideration in Bowman v. Railway Company, 125 U. S. 465, and Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.,
IOO, were enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State. and not at all as regulations of commerce with foreign
nations and among the States, but as they inhibited the receipt
of an imported commodity, or its disposition before it had
ceased to become an article of trade between one State and
another, or another country and this, they amounted in effect
to a regulation of such commerce. Hence, it was held that
inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national
in its character and must be governed by a uniform system, so
long as Congress did not pass any laws to regulate it specifically, or in such way as to allow the laws of the State to operate
upon it, Congress thereby indicated its will that such commerce
should be free and untramelled, and therefore that the laws of
Iowa, referred to, wer inoperative in so far as they amounted
to regulations of foreign or interstate commerce, in inhibiting
the reception of such articles within the State, or their sale
upon arrival, in the form in which they were imported there
from a foreign country or another State. It followed as a
corollary that, when Congress acted at all, the result of its action must be to operate as a restraint upon that perfect freedom which its silence insured.
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Congress has now spoken, and declared that imported
liquors or liquids shall, upon arrival in a State, fall within the
category of domestic articles of similar nature. Is the law
open to constitutional objection ?
By the first clause of Section IO of Article I, of the Constitution, certain powers are enumerated which the States are
forbidden to exercise in any event; and by clauses two and
three, certain others, which may be exercised with the consent
of Congress. As to those in the first class, Congress cannot
relieve from the positive restriction imposed. As to those in
the second, their exercise may be authorized; and they include
the collection of the revenue from imposts and duties on
imports and exports, by State enactments, subject to the reversion and control of Congress; and a tonnage duty, to the
exaction of which only the consent of Congress is required.
Beyond this, Congress is not empowered to enable the State
to go in this direction. Nor can Congress transfer legislative
powers to a State nor sanction a State law in violation of the
Constitution; and if it can adopt a State law as its own, it
must be one that it would be competent for it to enact itself,
and not a law passed in the exercise of the police power:
Cooley v. Port Wardens of Pildadelia, 12 How. 299; Gutnn
v.Barry, 15 Wall. 6IO, 623 ; United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41.
It does not admit of argument that Congress can neither
delegate its own powers nor enlarge those of a State. This
being so, it is urged that the Act of Congress cannot be sustained as a regulation of commerce, because the Constitution,
in the matter of interstate commerce, operates exproprio vigore
as a restraint upon the power of Congress to so regulate it as
to bring any of its subjects within the grasp of the police
power of the State. In other words, it is earnestly contended
that the Constitution guarantees freedom of commerce among
the States in all things, and that not only may intoxicating
liquors be imported from one -State into another, without being
subject to regulation under the laws of the latter, but that
Congress is powerless to obviate the result.
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Thus, the grant to the general government of a power designed to prevent embarassing restrictions upon interstate
commerce by any State, would be made to forbid any restraint
whatever. We do not concur in this view. In surrendering
their own power over external commerce, the States did not
secure absolute freedom in such commerce, but only the protection from encroachment afforded by confiding its regulation
exclusively to Congress.
By the adoption of the Constitution the ability of the several
States to act upon the matter solely in accordance with their
own will was extinguished, and the legislative will of the general government substituted. No affirmative guaranty was
thereby given to any State of the right to demand as between
it and the others what it could not have obtained before;
while the object was undoubtedly sought to be attained of preventing commercial regulations partial in their character or
contrary to the common interests. And the magnificent
growth and prosperity of the country attest the success which
has attended the accomplishment of that object. But this
furnishes no support to the position that Congress could not,
in the exercise of the discretion reposed in it, concluding that
the common interests did not require entire freedom in the
traffic in ardent spirits enact the law in question. In so doing,
Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate
commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or
to grant a power not possessed by the States or to adopt State
laws. It has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce one
common rule, whose uniformity is not affected by variations in
State laws in dealing with such property.
The principle upon which local option laws, so called, have
been sustained is, that while the Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law, it can make a law which leaves it to
municipalities or the people to determine some fact or state of
things, upon which the action of the law may depend; but we
do not rest the validity of the Act of Congress on this analogy.
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The power over interstate commerce is too vital to the integrity of the nation to be qualified by any refinement of reasoning.
The power to regulate is solely in the general Government,
and it is an essential part of that regulation to prescribe the
regular means for accomplishing the introduction and incorporation of articles into and with the mass of property in the
country or State: 12 Wheat. 448.
No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide
that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall
be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at
an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it
is not within its competency to do so.
The differences of opinion which have existed in this
tribunal in many leading cases upon this subject, have arisen,
not from a denial of the power of Congress, when exercised,
but upon the question whether the inaction of Congress was
in itself equivalent to the affirmative interposition of a bar to
the operation of an undisputed power possessed by the States.
We recall no decision giving color to the idea that when
Congress acted, its action would be less potent than when it
kept silent.
The framers of the Constitution never intended that the
legislative power of the nation should find itself incapable of
disposing of a subject matter specifically committed to its
charge. The manner of that disposition brought into determination upon this record, involves no ground for adjudging the
Act of Congress inoperative and void.
We inquire then, whether fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into the State of
Kansas, and there offered for sale and sold, after the passage
of the Act, became subject to the operation and effect of the
existing laws of that State in reference to such articles. It is
said that this cannot be so, because, by the decision in Leisy
v. Hardin, similar State laws were held unconstitutional, in so
far as they prohibited the sale of liquors by the importer in
the condition in which they had been imported. In that case,
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certain beer imported into Iowa had been seized in the original
packages or kegs, unbroken and unopened, in the hands of the
importer, and the Supreme Court of Iowa held this seizure to
have been lawful under the statutes of the State. We reversed
the judgment upon the ground that the legislation to the
extent indicated, that is to say, as construed to apply to importations into the State from without, and to permit the seizure
of the articles, before they had by sale or other transmutation,
become a part of the common mass of property of the State,
was repugnantlto the third clause of section eight of article
one of the Constitution of the United States, in that it could
not be given that operation without bringing it into collision
with the implied exercise of a power exclusively confided to
the general government. This was far from holding that the
statutes in question were absolutely void, in whole or in part,
and as if they never had been enacted. On the contrary, the
decision did not annul the law, but limited its operations to
property strictly within the jurisdiction of the State.
In Chicago, Mkilwaukee, &c. Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.
41 8, it was held that the Act of the Legislature of the State of
Minnesota, of March 7th, I887, establishing a railroad and
warehouse commission, as constructed by the Supreme Court
of that State, by which construction we were bound in considering the case, was in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States in the particulars complained of by the railroad
company, but, nevertheless, the case was remanded with an
instruction for further proceedings. And Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for this Court, said: "In view of the opinion
delivered by that Court, it may be impossible for any further
proceedings to be taken/other than to dismiss the proceeding
for a mandamus, if the Court should adhere to its option that
under the statute, it cannot investigate judicially the reasonableness of the rates fixed by the commission."
In Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, an Act of the Legislature of the State of Texas, levying a tax upon the occupation
of selling liquors, malt and otherwise, but not of selling
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domestic wines or beer, was held inoperative so far as it
discriminated against imported wines or beer, but as Tiernan
was a seller of other liquors as well as domestic, the tax against
him was upheld.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested by the State
authorities-for selling imported liquor on the 9 th of August.,
189o, contrary to the laws of the State. The Act of Congress
had gone into effect on the 8th of August, 189o, providing
that imported liquors should be subject to the operation and
effect of the State laws to the same extent and in the same
manner as though the liquors had been produced in the State;
and the laws of Kansas forbade the sale. Petitioner was
thereby prevented from claiming the right to proceed in
defiance of the law of the State, upon the implication arising
from the want of action on the part of Congress up to that
time. The laws of the State had been passed in the exercise
of its police powers, and applied to the sale of all intoxicating
liquors whether imported or not, there being no exception as
to those imported and no inference arising, in view of the provisions of the State Constitution and the terms of law (within
whose mischief all intoxicating liquors came), that the State
did not intend imported liquors to be included. We do not
mean that the intention is to be imputed of violating any constitutional rule, but that the State law should not be regarded
as less comprehensive than its language is, upon the ground
that action under it might in particular instances be adjudged
invalid from an external cause.
Congress did not use terms of permission to the State to act
but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the
State laws in respect to imported packages in their original
condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its'
part. It imparted no power to the State not then possessed,
but allowed imported property to fall at once upon arrival
within the local jurisdiction.
It appears from the agreed statement of facts that this
liquor arrived in Kansas prior to the passage of the Act of
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Congress, but no question is presented here as to the right of
the importer in reference to the withdrawal of the property
from the State, nor can we perceive that the Congressional
enactment is given a retrospective operation by holding it
applicable to a transaction of sale occuring after it took effect.
This is not the case of a law enacted in the unauthorized
exercise of a power exclusively confided to Congress, but of a
law which it was competent for the State to pass, but which
could not operate upon articles occupying a certain situation
until the passage of the Act of Congress. That Act, in terms,
removed the obstacle, and we perceive no adequate ground for
adjudging that a re-enactment of the State law was required
before it could have the effect upon imported which it had
always had upon domestic property.
Jurisdiction attached, not in virtue of the law of Congress,
but because the effect of the latter was to place the property
where jurisdiction could attach.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Brewer
concurred in the judgment of reversal. but not in all the reasoning of the opinion of the Court.
THE TE R
EXCLUSIv] AS APPLIED TO THE FEDERAL POWER

OvER COMMERCE.
Hamilton's Rule for determining when a power utas exclu.live in
Congress.
"This exclusive delegation, or
rather this alienation of State Sovereignty," says Hamilton, J'would
only exist in threecases; where the
Constitution, in express words,
granted an exclusive authority in
the union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the union;
and in another prohibited the states
from exercising a like authority;
and where it granted an authority

to the union to which a similar
authority in the states would be
absolutely and totally contradictory
and repugnant:" Federalist, Number 32.
A grant to Congress, where the
words of the Constitution are not
explicit, depends on the subject
matter of the grant. And it follows
that whether we consider a particular legislative power as exclusively
in Congress, will depend in a great
measure on what we consider is the
effect on the legislative power of
the states of the delegation of an
exclusive power to the Federal
Government.

THE TERM EXCLUSIVE AS APPLIED TO

The history of the cases dealing
with the power of Congress over
commerce attest the truth of this
assertion. The effect of an exclusive power of legislation in Congress
on the legslative power of the
states, which forms the content of
the term, " exclusive power of
Congress," has undergone no less
than three radical modifications
when applied the subject of commerce.
Mfr. Webster's view of the nature
of an exclusive power.
In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wh. I, two views of the nature of
an exclusive power in Congress are
advanced. The State of New York
granted to Robert R. Livingston
and Robert Fulton the exclusive
right,to navigate, with boats moved
by steam, the waters within her
jurisdiction. Gibbons wasthe owner
of two steamboats for which he had
procured coasting licenses, as provided by the laws of the United
States. These .boats he attempted
to run from Elizabethtown, New
Jersey, to the City of New York,
when he was stopped by an injunction issued by the highest court of
the state. An appeal was then
taken to the United States Supreme
Court. The case for the appellants
was argued on two grounds: First,
regulations of commerce are exclusively in Congres ; Second, even if
the state had a right to regulate
commerce by granting a coasting
license, Congress had given the
boat a right to pass unhindered over
all the navigable waters of the
United States, and any state law
abridging this right was in conflict
with the actual regulations of Congress on the subject.
The decision, declaring the law

of New York void, was based on the
second contention, and, therefore,
cannot be said to have determined
the question whether the power of
Congress over commerce was exclusive or concurrent. Mr. Justice
Johnson in his concurring opinion
criticises the majority for basing
their opinion on such a narrow
ground. He says, "I do not regard
it (the license) as the foundation of
the right set up in behalf ot the
appellant . . . and I cannot
overcome the conviction, that if the
licensing act was repealed tomorrow, the right of the appellant
to the reversal of the decision complained of, would be as strong as it
is under this license:" Ix9 Wh. pp.
231, 232.
On the other hand it
must be admitted that Mr. Justice
Story, who was one of the majority,
undoubtedly considered that the
exclusive right ofthe Federal power
over commerce had been finally
determined: ii Pet. 102 ; see infra.
The argument of counsel and the
opinion set forth very clearly
the different ideas of the effect of an
exclusive power on the power of
state legislation. Mr. Webster, the
counsel for the appellant, Ogden,
in an argument of unexcelled
ability, contended that the power
over commerce was exclusive from
the nature of the union and the
purposes of the grant. He says:
"From the very nature of the case,
these powers (of Congress over
Commerce) must be exclusive; that
is the higher-branches of commercial regulation must be exclusively committed to a single hand.
What is to be regulated? Not the
commerce of the several states, respectively, but the commerce of the
United States.
Henceforth, the
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commerce of the states was to be a
unit; and the system by which it
was to exist and be governed, must
necessarily be complete, entire and
uniform. It should be repeated
that the words used in the constitution, "to regulate commerce," are
so very general and extensive, that
they might be construed to cover a
vast field of legislation, part of
which has always been occupied by
state laws; and, therefore, the
words must have a reasonable construction, and the power should be
considered as exclusively vested in
Congress, so far, and so far only, as
the nature of the power requires."
And lie insisted, "that the nature of
the case, and of the power, did
imperiously require, that such important authority as that of granting
monopolies of trade and navigation,
should not be considered as still retained by the states." 9 Wh. pp.
13, 14.
Yet Mr. Webster in the same
argument admits that a state can
pass laws which affect commerce in
spite of the exclusive nature of the
grant to the Federal Government.
He, therefore, admits the constitutionality of state laws establishing
turnpikes, and of state quarantine
"Generally speaking," he
laws
argued, "roads and bridges, and
ferries, though, of course, they
affect commerce and intercourse, do
not attain that importance and
elevation, as to be deemed cominercialregulations. . . . quarantine laws, for example, may be considered as affecting commerce, yet
they are in their nature health laws.
In England, we speak of the power
of regulating commerce, as in
Parliament, or the King, as arbiter
of commerce; yet the City of

London enacts health laws. Would
anyone infer from that circumstance, that the City of London had
concurrent power with Parliament,
or the Crown to regulate cornmerce? Or, that it might grant a.
monopoly of navigation of the
And he adds, "While
Thames?"
a health law is reasonable, it is a
health law; but, if under color of
it, enactments should be made for
other purposes, such enactments
might be void: " 9 Wh. p. 2o.
ChiefJuslice Marshall's view of
the nature of an exclusive power.
Mr. Webster's point of view is
adopted by Chief Justice MarshallSpeaking of the state inspection
laws, he says: "That inspection
laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce,
will not be denied; but that apower
to regulate commerce is the source
from which the right to pass them
is derived, cannot be admitted ...
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which
embraces everything within the
territory of a state, not surrendered
to the general government; all
which can be most advantageously
exercised by the states themselves.
Inspection laws, quarantine laws,
health laws of every description, as
well as laws for regulating the
internal commerce of a state, and
those which respect turnpike roads,
ferries, etc., are component parts of
thismass." . . . "Itisobvious
that the government of the union,
in the exercise of its express powers,
that, for example, of regulating
commerce with foreign nations and
among the states, may use means
that may also be employed by a
state, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers; that for example,
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of regulating commerce within the
state. If Congress license vessels
to sail from one port to another,
into the same state, the actis supposed to be, necessarily, incidental
to the power expressly granted to
Congress, and implies no claim of
the direct power to regulate the
purely internal commerce of a state,
or to act directly on its system of
.police. So, if a State, in passing
laws on subjects acknowledged to
'be within its control, and with a
-view to those subjects, shall adopt a
measure of the same character with
-one which Congress may adopt, it
does not derive its authority from
the particular power which has been
granted, bilt from some other which
remains with the state, and may be
executed by the same means. All
experience shows, that the same
measures, or measures scarcely
distinguishablefrom each other,
may flow from distinct Powers;
but this does not prove that the
powers themselves are identical."
(9 Wh. p. 203, 204.)
Mr.Oakley's, theoryofthe nature
of an exclusive power.
Mr. Odkley assumes in his argument in support of the law of
New York, that if the states and
Congress have no concurrent powers, then the provisions in the
Constitution that the laws made
in pursuance of it should be
supreme was useless. Thereby implying that an exclusive power in
Congress over such a thing as interstate and foreign commerce, would
prevent a state, even in the exercise of its reserved powers, from
passing any laws which Congress
could pass in the exercise of its
power over commerce. He says :
"The provision, that the law of

Congress shall be the supreme law
in such cases, is the ground of a
conclusive inference, not only that
there are concurrent powers, but
that those powers may be exercised
by both governments at the same
time. One law cannot be said to
be superior to another and to control it, unless it acts in a manner
inconsistent with and repugnant to
that other law. The question of
supremacy, therefore, can never
arise, unless in a case of actual
conflict or interference. Ifthe mere
exercise of a power by Congress
takes away all right from the state
to act under that power, then any
state law, under such a power,
would be void; not as conflicting
with the supreme law of Congress,
but as being repugnant to the provisions of the constitution itself,
and as being passed by the state, in
the first instance, without authority. If this doctrine were true,
then the provision that the laws of
Congress should be supreme, was
entirely idle. It would have been
sufficient to have said merely, that
the constitution should be supreme." 9 Wh. p. 41.
It is to this contention, that an
exclusive power in Congress prevents a State passing any laws
which Congress could by any' possibility pass in the exercise of the
power exclusively delegated to it,
that the remarks I have italicized
in the above quotation from Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion were
directed.
The decision in Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co.
The opinion of Chief Justice Marshall that an exclusive power in
Congress to regulate commerce
only prevented the states from pass-
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murrer of the plaintiffs to the pleas
ing laws which in effect regulated
of the defendant. The Supreme
commerce as commerce, and does
Court affirmed the judgment. Chief
not prevent them from passing
laws in the exercise of their re- Justice Marshall said: "The counsel for the plaintiffs in error insist
served powers, which incidentally
that it comes in conflict with the
affected commerce, provided such
power of the United States to reguregulations do not conflict with the
late commerce with foreign nations
actual legislation of Congress, was
apparently concurred in by all the and among the several states.
"If Congress had passed any act
members of his court. On this
which bore upon the case; any act
principle they supported the law of
Delaware, in Wilson v. Black Bird in execution of the power to regulate commerce; the objectof which
Creek Marsh Co. : 2 Pet. 240.
was to control state legislation over
The State of Delaware authorized
those small navigable creeks into
the Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. to
which the tide flows, and which
obstruct the Black Bird Creek by
abound through the lower country
erecting dams. The Black Bird
Creek, in the language of Mr. Wirt, of the middle and southern states,
one of the counsel in the case, "Is
we should feel not mush difficulty
one of those sluggish reptile in saying that a state law coming
in conflict with such act would be
streams, that do not run, but creep,
void; but Congress has passed no
and which, wherever it passes,
spreads its venom and destroys the such act. The repugnancy of the
law of Delaware to the constitution
health of all who inhabit its
marshes : " 2 Pet. p. 249. The is placed entirely on its repugnancy
measure was one designed to imto the power to regulate commerce
prove the sanitary condition of a
with foreig nations and among
several states; a power which has
considerable section of country,
not been so exercised as to affect
and was at the same time plainly
adapted to that end. On the other
the question :" 2 Pet. p. 252.
Mr. Justice Story apiparenily
hand, the stream was navigable.
adopted M r. Oakley's view of the
A ship called the "Sally," regularly
nature of an exclusive power over
licensed and enrolled according to
commnerce.
the navigation laws of Congress,
The views as to the exclusive
broke down the dam which obstructed the stream. An action of nature of the power of commerce,
and the nature of an exclusive power,
trespass vi et armis was brought
thus twice reiterated in an opinion
by the company. The defendant
claimed that the company had un- of the court, would have probably
settled down into fixed constitulawfully obstructed a public navitional principles, had it not been
He relied in the
gable stream.
for the apparent adoption of Mr.
argument mainly on the decision of
Oakley's view of the nature of an
the Supreme Court of the United
exclusive power by Mr. Justice
States in the case of Gibbons v.
Story in his dissent in New York
Ogden. The case came to the
Supreme Court on a judgment of v. Mfiln, ii Pet. 102.
New York had passed a law rethe State Court, sustaining the de-
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quiring, among other things, the
master of any ship from a foreign
countryto make, within twenty-four
hours after the arrival of his vessel,
an affidavit of the name, age, and
occupation, etc., of each of his passgers. Therewas apenaltyof$75.oo
attached to each and every violation
of the ordinance: Act of February
iith, 1824. The court held the Act
constitutional.
Mr. Blount, counsel for the state,
had assumed as Mr. Oakley had
done in Gibbons v. Ogden, that if
the court decided the power over
commerce to be exclusively in
Congress, the state harbor laws and
quarantine laws would be void.
He even went so far as to give a
complete list of all the harbor and
quarantine laws of the various
states, apparently for the purpose
of appalling the court, by showing
them the sweepingand far-reaching
results of a decision adverse to the
state. The Opinion of Mr. Justice
Barbour, nominally that of the
majority (subsequently there was
a discussion among the members of
the bench as to whether the opinion
of Mr. Justice Barbour was properly
the opinion of the court: see Passenger Cases, 9 How. pp. 443-487),
adopted Chief Justice Marshall's
view of the nature of an exclusive
power. "We shall not enter into
any examination of the question
whether the power to regulate commerce be, or be not, exclusive of
the states, because the opinion we
have formed renders it unnecessary;
in other words, weare of the opinion
that the act is not a regulation of
commerce, but of police; and that
being so considered, it was passed
in the exercise of a power which

rightfully belonged to the states:
ii Pet. p. 132.
Mr. Justice Story, however, in his
dissent, says: "It has been argued
that the Act of New York is not a
regulation of commerce, but is a
mere police law on the subject of
paupers; . . . A state cannot
make a regulation of conmerce to
enforce its health laws, because it
is a means withdrawnfrom its authoritjy. It may be admitted that
it is a means adapted to the end;
but it is quite a different question
whether it be a means within the
competency of the state's jurisdiction." And he adds, "Buthowcan
it be truly said that the Act of New
York is not a regulation of commerce ? .o one can well doubt,
that if the same act had been passed
by Congress it would have been a
regulationofcommerce, and in that
way, and in that only, would itbe a
constitutional act of Congress. The
right of Congress to pass such an
act has been expressly conceeded
in the argument: ir Pet. 156, 557.
An exclusive power with Mr.
Justice Story would thus seem to deprive the state of the right to pass
any act which Congress might pass
in the exercise of her exclusive power; and though he admits that the
state may pass "health laws, quarantine laws, ballot laws, gunpowder
laws, and others of a similar nature," he appears from what he
subsequently says to do so because
Congress, in the exercise of any of
its own powers, could not pass such
laws.
In view of this difference between
the ideas of Mr. Justice Story and
the Chief Justice as to the meaning
of an exclusive power, it is supris-
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ing to read at the end of Judge
Story's dissent: "Such is a brief
view of the grounds upon which
my judgment is, that the act of
New York is unconstitutional
and void. In this opinion, I have
the consolation to krow that I had
the entire concurrence, upon the
same grounds, of that great constitutional jurist, the late Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall." We cannot but
think that "upon the same grounds"
did not mean on "all grounds."
Mr. Justice Story also puts his
decision on the conflict of the state
laws with the actual regulations of
Congress. Chief Justice Marshall
would not be likely to abandon,
though he might modify, the idea
of the nature of an exclusive power
he had so clearly stated.
The various ideas of exclusive
and concurrent piowers maintainted
by the members of the court in the
License Cases.
The idea of an exclusive power
advanced by Mr. Justice Story, concerning the resulton the state power
of legislation of considering the
power to regulate commerce as exclusively in Congress, led many
members of the Bench to consider
the powerover commerce as concurrent in the states. The argument
for the concurrent power ofthestates
over commerce based on the early
adoption of the state pilot laws by
Congress, was now almost irresist
able. Either the pilot laws / were
invalid, or the power to regulate
commerce was concurrent.
The
confusion
resulting from
this
change of feeling, both as to the
nature of an exclusive power, and
as to the nature of the power to
regulate commerce, is well shown
by the opinion of four of the mem-

bers of the court in the "License
Cases: " 5 How. p. 507.
The most important of these cases
was that of Peirce v. New Hampshire. The laws of that state made
it an offense, punishable by a fine,
for any one to sell wine or other
spiritous liquors without a license
from the selectmen of the town.
One Pierce, imported coastwise
from Boston a barrel of American
gin, and sold the same in the
unbroken packages, or barrel, without first obtaining the required
license. For this he was indicted
and fined in the courts of the state.
He appealed to the Supreme Court
on the ground that the act conflicted with the power over commerce
granted to Congress. The judges
all concurred in the decision sustaining the conviction and the constitutionality of the law of New.
Hampshire as applied to the facts
of the case, but were unable to
agree on the ground of their decision, and therefore furnished separate opinions.
The opinion of Chief Justice
Taney shows, it must be confessed,
a certain confusion of thought on
the subject of the nature of an
exclusive power. Some passages
seem to indicate that he had adopted the view of an exclusive power
held by his predecessor. As for
instance, the following: "The controlling and supreme power over
commerce with foreign nations
and the several states is undoubtedly conferred upon Congress. Yet,
in my judgment, the state may,
nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the health of its citizens,
make regulations of commerce for
its own ports and harbors, and for
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its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in
conflict with a law of Congress: 5
How. p. 579. On the other hand
he says: "The law of New Hampshire acts directly npon an import
from one state to another, while in
the hands of the importer for sale,
and is therefore a regulation of
commerce, acting upon the article
while it is within the admitted jurisdiction o the gene. - government,
and subject to its control and regulation.
"The question, therefore, brought
up for decision is, whether a state
is prohibited by the constitution of
the United States from making any
regulation of foreign commerce, or
of commerce with another state,
although such regulation is confined
to its own territory:" 5. How. p.
578. This question, Chief Justice
Taney answered in the negative.
While confessing that the law of
New Hampshire regulated commerce, he nevertheless sustained
the law because it did not come in
conflict with the actual regulation
of Congress on the subject. And
though it is doubtful whether the
Chief Justice would have allowed a
State to make laws regulating commerce as commerce which extended
beyond her jurisdiction ; this is
more because a State has no power
to extend her jurisdiction, rather
than because he considered the
power of commerce granted to
Congress as exclusive. He certainly
believed that the concurrent power
of a state over commerce extended
so far as the acts which make up
commerce take place within the
state.
We find in Mr. Justice Catron
the clearest advocate of the view of

the nature of an exclusive power
which had been indicated by Mfr.
Justice Story. He says: "The
assumption is, that the police
power was not touched by the
constitution, but left to the states
as the constitution found it. This
is admitted; and whenever a thing,
from character or condition, is of
a description to be regulated by
that power in the state, then the
regulation may be. made by the
state and Congress cannot interfere.
But this must always depend on
facts, subject to legal ascertainment,
so that the injured may have redress. And the fact which must
first find its support is this, whether
the prohibited article belongs to
and is subject to be regulated as
part of foreign commerce, or of
commerce among the states. If,
'from its nature, it does not belong
to commerce, or if its condition,
from putrescence or other cause, is
such, when it is about to enter the
state, that it no longer belongs to
commerce, or in other words, is
not a commercial article, then the
state power may exclude its introduction. And here is the limit between the sovereign power of the
state and the Federal power, That
is to say, that which does not belong
to commerce is within thejurisdiclion of the police powerof the state.
and that which does belong to corn,nerce is within the jurisdictionof
the United States: 5 How. pp. 5196oo. If the power over commerce
is exclusive, it prevents the states,
not only from regulating commerce
as commerce, but excludes them
from affecting the subjects of commerce in the exercise of the police
or any other reserved power. "This
narrows the controversy to the
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single point, whether the states
have power to regulate their own
mode of commerce among the
states, during the time the power
of Congress lies dormant, and has
not been exercised in regard to
such commerce:" 5 How. p. 6oi.
And his conclusion that the law of
New Hampshire is constitutional,
rests entirely on the affirmative
answer which he gives to this question. In other words, that the
power over commerce is concurrent
in the states.
Mr. Justice Nelson concurred in
the opinion: 5 How. p, 618.
Mr. Justice McLean and Mr. Justice Grier held the same view regarding an exclusive power as
Chief Justice Marshall. That is to
say they did not regard it as preventing a state from passing laws
of police which affected commerce.
There was, however, this vital distinction between them. Whatever
view the members of the court had
held regarding the nature of particular powers, or the nature of the
"exclusive powers" in general, they
all agreed on the general proposition, that in case of a conflict between two constitutional laws, one
Federal and the other emenating
from a State, the laws of Congress
were supreme.
"In argument,"
said Chief Justice Marshall, "it
has been contended that if a law
passed by the state in the exercise
of its acknowledged sovereignty
comes into conflct with a law
passed by Congress in pursuance
of the constitution, they affect the
subject and each other like equal
opposing powers.
"But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things
and provided for it by declaring the

supremacy not only of itself, but of
the laws made in pursuance of it :"
9 Wh. p. 210. In the opinion of
Mr. Justice McLean, is the first
time we find the theory, thus condemned, received with approval by
any member of the bench. Speaking of conflicting state and Federal laws, he says: "And when
a conflict occurs, the inquiry must
necessarily be, which is the paramount law? And that must depend
upon the supremacy of the power
by which it was enacted :" 5 How.
p. 588. And again: "When in the
appropriate exercise of these Federal and state powers, contingently
and incidentally their lines of
action run into each other; if the
state power be necessary to the
preservation of the morals, the
health or the safety of the community, it must be maintained:" 5
How. p. 592-3.
Mr. Justice Grier held the same
view as Mr. Justice McLean. In
his opinion in the License Cases,
he says, speaking of the health and
morals of the people, "As subjects
of legislation they are from their
very nature, of primary importance; they lie at the foundation of
social existence; they are for the
protection of life and liberty, and
necessarily compel all laws on the
subjects of secondary importance,
which relate only to property, commerce, or lnxury, to recede when
they come in conflict or collision.
Saluspofpuli suprenia lex."
The confusion of thought in the
Passenger Cases.
The next important case or cases
to come before the Supreme Court,
which involved the commerce
clause of the Constitution was the
Passenger Cases: 7 How. 283.
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The laws of New York, whose
constitutionality was brought into
question, taxed every cabin passenger arriving from a foreign port
$i.5o, and any steerage passenger,
mate, sailor, or mariner$i.oo: Rev.
Stat. pp. 445, 446. The money so
received was to be denominated
"the hospital fund," and was appropriated to the use of the marine
hospital.
The majority held that the law
was void because it conflicted with
the regulations of commerce by
Congress.
There were three possible ways
in which one could regard this
law: First, as a police measure not
conflicting with the actual regulations of commerce by Congress, and
therefore valid, even though the
federal power over commerce was
exclusive, provided one adopted
the idea of exclusiveness held by
Chief Justice Marshall. Second, as
a regulation of commerce, because
it did that which Congress in the
exercise of its power over the subject could do, and therefore void,
or constitutional according as one
adopted or rejected the theory of a
concurrent power over commerce
remaining in the states. Lastly,
void in any event because conflicting with the actual regulations of
Congress. Mr. Justice McLean,
while attacking the "Concurrent
theory," takes the occasion to
reiterate his opinion as to the
supremacy of the state police laws
in case of a confict with the laws of
Congress: How. pp. 396, 397. He
did not consider, however, that the
law in question was a police law,
but regarded it as a regulation of
commerce.
Mr. Justice Wayne
also thought the law a regulation

of commerce such as a state could
not make, while admitting that a
state could pass quarantine and
health laws which affected commerce: 7 How. p. 414. He thus
adopted the theory of an exclusive
power held by Chief Justice Marshall.
Mr. Justice Catron and the Chief
Justice both think the power of the
states over commerce is concurrent,
but the former regards the law of
the state as conflicting with the will
of Congress, and therefore void,
while the latter does not consider
there is such a conflict, and supports the law, pp. 443 and 471. It
is true that the Chief Justice mainly
rests his opinion on the ground
that passengers are not subjects of
commerce, and therefore, a state
can prohibit foreigners from landing. A position, which, at the
present time, would not be tenable:
7 How. pp. 465, 470.
One thing was shown very plainly
by the discussion in the Passenger
Cases, and that was, that the opinion
that the states held a concurrent
power over commerce, did not by
any means settle the disputes over
the commerce clause in the Constitution. It was more difficult to tell
when a law of a state law conflicted
with the will of the Congress. than
to decide in the first place whether
the federal power was exclusive or
concurrent.
The decision in Cooley v.
Boardof Wardens :
It was in this state of conflicting
and confused opinion on the bench
itself that the case of Cooley v.
Port Wardens (12 How. 299) came
before the court. This case involved
the constitutionality of the pilot
regulations of a state. The eourt
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might have decided that the power
to regulate commerce was concurrent, and thus upheld the validity
of laws which had remained unquestioned for over fifty years. To
say the power over commerce was
exclusively iu Congress, would
under the idea of an exclusive
power entertained by Justices Story
and Catron, rendered these laws
unconstitutional.
The opinion of the court by Mr.
Justice Curtis is noticeable from two
points of view. First, it is written
on the assumption that the pilot
laws are a direct regulation of commerce by the states. "And a majority of the court," he says, "are
of an opinion that a regulation of
pilots is a regulation of commerce
within the grant of Congress of the
commercial power." (12 How. p.
317.) To uphold their constitutionality, he was obliged to support the theory that the states
had a concurrent power over commerce, for he assumes that did
he hold the power of Congress
over commerce to be exclusive,
the pilot laws would be unconstitutional, forgetting that Chief
Justice Marshall had regarded these
laws as valid, while he had at the
same time thought the power of
Congress over commerce to be exclusive. The assumption of the
invalidity of the pilot laws if the
power over commerce was exclusively in commerce, was q, complete triumph of the idea of an
exclusive power, apparently entertained by 'Mr. Justice Story, and
which would prevent a State from
passing any law which Congress
could pass in the exercise of that
power.
The other noticeable feature of the

decision was the division of the
nature of the power of Congress
over commerce, as concurrent or
exclusive, accordingto the particular
subject of the power. MNr. Justice
Curtis says: "Now the power to
regulate commerce embraces a vast
field, containing, not only many,
but exceedingly various subjects,
quite unlike in their nature; some
imperatively demanding a single
rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every
port; and some likethe subject now
in question, as imperatively demanding the diversity, whichtalone
can meet the local necessity of
navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or
deny that the nature of this power
requires exclusive legislation by
Congress, is to loose sight of the
nature of the subjects of this power,
and to assert concerning all of them
what is really applicable to a part.
Whatever subjects of this power are
in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system, or plan
of regulation, may justly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
12 How. p. 319.
From this decision we can reduce two propositions: First, that the nature of
the power over commerce was
divisible, partly exclusive, partly
concurrent, depending upon the
nature of the subject. Second, that
the word erclusiEe must he taken
in the sense it is employed by Mr.
Justice Story, and not in the sense
employed by Chiefjustice Mvarshall;
therefore, where from the nature of
the subject the commercial power
was exclusive, a state law which
affected such a subject, though
passed in good faith, as a police
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measure, or for the object of improving the internal commerce of
the country, would be unconstitutional.
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens
decided that the states had a concurrent power over pilots. This
decision was followed in Stearnship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450 ; Ex.
Parte McNeil 13 Wall., 236; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572.
For the next few years the decision of the court in cases involving
the commerce clause are mainly
employed in showing the limit of
the concurrent power of the states
over commerce. Thus, it has been
held that a State cannot bridge a
stream which forms her boundary:
See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
Bridge Company, 13 How. 518;
but she can, on the other hand,
bridge navigable streams wholly
within her borders. Gillman v.
Philadelphia,3Wall. 713; Escanaba
Compbany v. Chicago, 107 U. S.
678; Cadwell v. Bridge Company,
113 U. S. 205 ; Hamilton v. Vicksburg Railroad Comiany, 119 U. S.
28o; Williamette Bridge Company v. H-atch, 125 U. S. I.
Not only can the states build
bridges bver certain streams, but
also dams, partially or totally obstructing their navigation. Pound
v. Truck, 95 U. S. 459. In the
improvement of her water ways a
State can alter the course of a
river. Withersv. Buckley, 2o How.
84, or turn a river into a canal, and
charge vessels for its use, to pay
for the improvement. Sands v.
Improvement Company, 123 U. S.
288; Ruggles v. Ibid. 123 U. S.
297 A State can 'also improve her
harbors. County ofMobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S., p. 691 ; or build her

own

wharves.

Ouchita Packet
121 U. S. 444.
For a full discussion of this subject see the American Law Register,article on "The Law Governing
an Original Package," in July,
August, November, December, 189o.
The general conclusion from the
cases there cited, into which it
would be a work of supererogation
to enter here, is that, those subjects of commerce which require
a uniform regulation, are from
their nature, exclusively under the
control of Congress. But at the
same time the state has not, necessarily, a concurrent authority over
all subjects which may demand
diversified legislation. True, the
power over subjects, requiring uniform regulation is exclusively in
Congress, because the necessity for
uniformity proves the national
nature of the subject. But subjects
requiring diversified legislation
mayalso be in their nature national.
As we saw in the "bridge-cases"
cited above.
The doctrine of the Silence of
Congress:
The case of Welton v. State of
Missouri,91 U. S. 275, marks theinitial step towards a return to,
Chief Justice Marshall's view of the
exclusive nature of the power over
commerce, and of the consequence
of an exclusive power on the legislative power of the states. The
State of Missouri passed a law requiring "Whoever shall deal in the
selling of patent or other medicine
goods, wares, or merchandise, except books, charts, maps, and
stationery, which are not the
growth, produce, or manufacture of
the state, by going from place to
place to sell the same, is declared

Company v. Arkin,

THE FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE.

to be a peddler." The other sections of the law prohibit a person
dealing as a peddler without a
license. For the license a tax was
charged. No license was required
for selling by going from place to
place with the products of the
state. It was probably contended
in the oral argument before the
court, that the state bad a right
to impose such regulation since
it did not conflict with the actual
regulations of commerce by Congress, for Mr. Justice Field, who
delivers the opinion of the court,
says: "The fact that Congress
has not seen fit to prescribe any
specific rules to govern interstate
commerce does not affect the question. Its action on this subject,
when considered with reference to
its legislation with resbect to
foreign commerce, is equivalent
to a declaration that interstate
commerce shall be free and untrammelled. As the main object
of that commerce is the sale and
the exchange of commodities,
the policy thus established would
be defeated by discriminating legislation, like that of Missouri." It
is probably true that Mr. Justice
Field at this time thought that the
non-conflict with the actual regulations of commerce by Congress did
not affect the question of the constitutionality of the law of Missouri
one way or the other.
This is far .from saying, as was
decided in the case reported, that
if Congress declares certain state
police laws do not conflict with its
will, then the state laws are valid.
In the case of the County of
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 591,
the same Justice speaking of the
power of Congress over commerce,

says: "The subject, indeed, upon
which Congress can act under this
power are of infinite variety, requiring for their successful management different plans or modes of
treatment. Some of them are national in their character, and admit
and requireuniformity ofregulation,
affecting alike all the states; others
are local, or are mere aids to commerce, and can only be properly
regulated by provisions adapted to
their special circumstances and
localities. Of the former class may
be mentioned all that portion of
commerce with foreign countries,
or between the states which consists
in the transportation, purchase, sale
and exchange ofcommodities. Here
there can of necessity be only one
system or plan of regulation, and
that Congress alone can prescribe.
Its non-action in such cases with
respect to any particular commodity
or mode of transportation is a
declaration of its purpose that the
commerce in that commodity or by
that means of transportation shall
be free. There would otherwise be
no security against conflicting regulations of different states, each
discriminating in favor of its own
products and citizens, ahd against
the product and citizens of other
states. And it is'a matter of public
history that the object of vesting in
Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and
among the states, was to insure
uniformity of regulation against
conflicting and discriminating state
legislation:" I102 U. S. p. 697.
I have giventhe whole quotation
for the purpose of showing that the
principle [object which the great
constitutional jurist had in mind
when talking about the fact that
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Congress had made no regulations,
was to prove, that over those things
which required uniformity of regulation the power was exclusively in
Congress, and not to announce the
doctrine, which was afterwards
based on these expressions, that the
will of Congress not conflicting, the
state could make such regulations
in the exercise of her police and
other reserved powers.
In the case of Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S. 465, however, we
have a decided change in the general
reasoning of the court. Instead of
treating the failure of Congress to
make any specific regulations as
something which did not make any
difference to the validity of the
state legislation, it is now treated as
the main point to be decided. Sec.
1553 of the Code ofthe State of Iowa
as amended by c. 143 of the Act
of 1886, forbid a common carrier
from bringing any intoxicating
liquors into the state, except under
the seal of the auditors of the county
to which it was to be transported,
certifying that the consignee was authorized to sell intoxicating liquors.
Speaking ofthe legislation, Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion
of the court, says: "It may, therefore, fairly be said, that the provision
in question has been adopted by the
State of Iowa, not expressly for the
purpose of regulating commerce
between its citizens and those of
other states, but as subservient to
the general design of protecting the
health and morals of its people, and
the peace and good order of the
state against the physical and moral
evils resulting from the unrestricted
manufacture and sale, within the
state, of intoxicating liquors:" 125
U. S. pp. 475, 476. The same Jus-

tice, speaking of the constitutionality of this law, refers to Cooley v.
Board of Port W~ardens, 12 How.
299, supra, as "a case in which the
distinction was made between cases
in which Congress has exerted its
power over commerce, and those in
which it has abstained from its exercise as bearing upon state legislation
touching the subject:" 125 U. S. p.
481. Butifweturntothiscase, it contains nothing concerning the action
or inaction of Congress as affecting
the question of the validity of state
legislation: seesupra. Howeverthis
may be, the court in the case before
us holds: "The question, therefore,
may be still considered in each case
as it arises, whether the fact that
Congress has failed in a particular
instance to provide by law a regulation of commerce amongthe states,
is conclusive of its intention that
the subject shall be free from all
positive regulations, or that, until
it positively interferes, such a commerce may be left to be freely dealt
with by the respective states: " 125
U. S. p. 483.
Thus, instead of the question
whether the power over the subject
is concurrent in the states or exclusively in Congress, these latter
cases unquestionably change the
ground of the discussion to the
question, whether the silence of
Congress is to be taken as an indication of its will that the particular
commerce or means of transportation shall be free from state interference.
This change in position was forced
upon the court by the change in
economic and social ideas which
produced the policy of State prohibition.
In the facts of the case of Leisy v.
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Hardin, r35 U. S. zoo, placed the
court in an extremely difficult position. The question involved was
whether a state law which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors
by the importer in the condition of
importation was valid. Had the
court held that the grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce per se rendered it impossible
for a state to pass such laws, then
prohibition, a policy which had
been adopted by many of the states,
would have become impossible. No
one, no matter how ardent a Federalist, desired such result. Yet the
court had repeatedly said that the
power to regulate the first sale of
an imported article was exclusively
in Congress, and if it adopted what
we have called Mr. Justice Story's
idea of an exclusive power, which
would preclude the states from
regulating the first sale in the exercise of their police powers, any
other conclusion was impossible.
On the other hand, it wasimpossible
to adopt, without qualification, Chief
Justice Marshall's idea of an exclusive power, which held that a state
could regulate, or, as he called it,
affect commerce in the exercise of
her police powers, althongh the
power over commerce was exclusively in Congress, unless such
state regulations conflicted with the
laws of Congress. This view would
have upheld the law of Iowa, but
at the same time it would, have
overruled those long line of cases
which had held that a state cannot
regulate for the purposes of police
or taxation, such act in furtherance
of commerce as the first sale by the
importer in the condition of importation.
The wisdom of the court was

never better shown than in the
solution of this difficult question,
a solution which had been foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Field in
his concurring opinion in the case
of Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S.
p. 507, and which has been practically carried out in the decision
in the case which is reported in
this number of the Law Register.
The court in these three cases fully
realizes that it has returned to the
idea of an exclusive power held
by Chief Justice Marshall when he
wrote: "Powers may not conflict,
but their exercise may" and again.
"The idea that the same measure
might, according to circumstances,
be arranged with different classes of
powers, was no novelty to the
framers of our own constitution."
9 Wh., p. 202.
The idea of an exclusive power
originally advanced by Mr. Oakley
in his argument in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, which would prevent the state from regulating the
subject of the grant to Congress,
even in the exercise of any of her
reserved powers, if it ever had been
seriously entertained by a majority
of the court is finally abandoned.
Originally advanced by the opponents of any extension of the
federal power over commerce, it had
served its purpose in compelling
many members of the court in the
days before the war to adopt the proposition, that the states retained, in
part at leaft, a concurrent power
over the subjects of commerce.
At the same time the court adopted
as a rule concerning those subjects
which in their nature are national
and require a uniform regulation,
that the inaction or silence of Congress will be taken as an indication

638

JENNINGS ET AL. V. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO., OF CANADA.

of its will, that such subjects shall be
free from stateinterference. Theresult, therefore, of the controversy
over the concurrent and exclusive
power of commerce is simply this,
that in certain cases the Supreme
Court will interpret "the Silence
of Congress," as indicating an intention that the commerce shall
be so untrammelled, that any
legislation of the states affecting
such commerce conflicts with the
legislative intention of Congress;
while in certain other cases which
do not seem- to require uniform
regulation, the "Silence of Congress" will not be interpreted
as a legislative intention, that such
commerce is to be free from state
interference. Of course Congress
has a right to interpret its own
legislative provisions, and when
it declares, as it did in the Wilson
Bill, that its acts shall not be interpreted to interfere with the state
police laws affecting liquors in the
hands of the importer, the Supreme
Court has no excuse for not following that interpretation,
There is one danger in the deci.

sion of the court in In Re Rahrer
which has not as yet, I believe, been
pointedout. Itmaybe foundinpractice that state laws legitimately designed to aid the internal commerce
of the state. orprovide the state with
revenue, may be permitted by a
Congress in which the influence of
a particular state is powerful. Many
of these laws would seriously embaress interstate commerce and be a
great lever by which to extend the
taxing power of the states. These
difficulties I believe will be settled
when they arise. Constitutional
law is something more than the
interpretation of a written instrument, it is also the adaption of that
instrument to changing economic
and social conditions. Nothing
proves this more clearly than the
solution of the constitutionality of
prohibition in the three cases of
Bowman v. Chicago, Leisy v.
Hardinand Zn Re Rahrer.
Whenever the present doctrine of
the "Silence of Congress" shall
cease to serve its purpose, it will be
modified to meet new conditions.

J],NNINGS, et al. v. GRAND TRUNK RkY. CO., OF CANADA.
[Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division. Oct. 6, 189.]
CARRIER

OF

GOODS-CONTRACT OF SHIPMENT-LIABILITY
INjURY-LmITATION.

FOR

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered upon order of the general
term of the Supreme Court in the fifth judicial department, affirming
judgment entered on report of referree in favor of the plaintiffs. Affirmed.
For shipment and transportation to East St. Louis, Ill., J. H. Shanley
& Co. caused to be delivered to the defendant, and the latter received
potatoes at the times, places, and in the quantities following: April I8,
1881, at Prescott, Canada, 4or bushels; April 18, I88I, at Edwardsburgh,
Canada, 812 bushels; April i8, I881, at Brockville, Canada, 4oo bushels ;
April 26, Y881, at Kingston, Canada, 402 bushels. The potatoes belonged
to J. H. Shanley & Co., who were named as consignees of all the potatoes
except those delivered to the defendant at Prescott. They were consigned
to the order of the Merchants' Bank of Canada, with directions to advise
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Shanley & Co., and all the potatoes reached the place of destination
except those shipped at Prescott They did not arrive there. The purpose
of the action was to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by
the negligence of the defendant in its failure to transport those last
mentioned, to the place of destination, and for their loss in consequence,
and in delaying the delivery at East St. Louis of those which did reach
there, by reason whereof the potatoes were injured, and the market price
had fallen when they did arrive at that place. The claim of Shanley &
Co. against the defendant was assigned to the plaintiffs. The defendant's
railway is within the dominion of Canada, of which it is a corporation.
Its most westerly station is Point Edward, but its practical western
terminus is Fort Gratiot, in the State of Michigan, where connection is
made with other railroads extending west. The plaintiffs gave evidence
to the effect, and the referee found, that on February 8, 18Si, Shanley &
Co. wrote a letter to the defendant's agent at Toronto, inquiring the
lowest rates for shipment of potatoes in car-load lots from Prescott, and
stations in that vicinity on its railway to East St. Louis, Ill., and certain
other places, and on the 12th of that month received an answer by letter
from the defendant's Assistant General Freight Agent, saying: "I will
give you the following rates on potatoes in full car-loads from Prescott,
and stations in the vicinity to . . . East St. Louis, 28 cents. Be
good enough to let me know if these rates are excepted before shipping,
so that I may advise our agents."
This offer was accepted by plaintiffs.
The defense was that the defendant was not responsible for delay or
negligence in the transportation of the potatoes beyond its own line.
To support its defense, the defendant put in evidence shipping bills,
which contained the following stipulations:
" Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada. This company will not
be responsible for any goods missent, unless they are consigned to a
station on their railway." . . . "That all goods addressed to consignees
at points beyond the places at which the company has stations, and
respecting which no direction to the contrary shall have been received at
those stations, will be forwarded to their destination by public carrier or
otherwise, as opportunity may offer, without any claim for delay against
the company for want of opportunity to forward them; or they may, at
the discretion of the company, be suffered to remain on the company's
premises, or be placed in shed or warehouse, (if there be such convenience
for receiving same) pending communication with consignees, at the risk
of the owners as to damage thereto from any cause whatsoever. But the
delivery of the goods by the company will be considered complete, and
all responsibility of said company shall cease, when such other carriers
shall have received notice that said company is prepared to deliver to
them the said goods for further conveyance; and it is expressly declared
and agreed that the said Grand Trunk Railway Company shall not be
responsible foranyloss, misdelivery, damage, ordetention occuring after the
said goods arrive at said stations or places on their line nearest to the
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points br places which they are consigned to, or beyond their said limits."
" Thatall prope'-ty contracted for at a through rate, or otherwise, to or from
places beyond the line of the Grand Trunk Railway, if shipped by water,
shall, while not on the company's railway, or in their sheds or warehouses,
be entirely at their owner's risk. In case of loss or damage to any goods
for which this company or connecting lines may be liable, it is agreed
that the company or lines so liable shall have the benefit of any insurance
effected by or for account of the owner of said goods, and the company so
liable shall be subrogated 'in such rights before any demand shall be
made on them.'"
".Thatno claim for damage to, loss of, or detention of,
any goods for which this company is accountable shall be allowed unless
notice in writing, and particulars of the claim for said loss, damage, or
detention are given to station freight agent at or nearest to the place of
delivery, within thirty-six hours after the goods in respect to which said
claim is made and delivered.
"These shipping bills were signed by, or in
the name of the person who delivered the potatoes to the defendant for
Shanley & Co., and the defendant's station agent gave receipt to said
persons.
t. The Court held that these facts were sufficient to sustain a finding that
the company had agreed to transport the goods beyond its own line to the
place to which they were consigned.
2. Where the bills of lading or receipts given to the shipper when he
delivered the goods to the carrier for transportation were surrendered by
him on receiving the goods at their destination, the fact that he did not
produce the bills or prove their contents at the trial does not give rise to
a presumption prejudicial to him as to the terms of the contract of shipment contained therein.
3. The carrier, which had entered into a contract with the shipper for
the transportation of the goods to the place of destination, had no right to
make inconsistent stipulations with the persons who delivered the goods
for the shipper; and provisions and conditions in the shipping bills,
signed by such persons without the knowledge of the shipper, limiting the
liability of the carrier to points on its own road, cannot be considered as
applicable to the shipment in question.
4. A provision in shipping bills that the carriershould not be esponsible
for delay in the transit of the property does not relieve it from liability for
delay occasioned by its own negligence.
5. A provision in shipping bills exempting the carrier from liability for
damages, unless a written notice of the particulars of the claim is given to
the freight agent at or nearest the place of delivery, within thirty-six
hours after the goods have been delivered, is applicable to shipments
beyond the carrier's lne, as well as to shipments to points on its line.
6. Such provision, which limits to thirty-six hours from the delivery of
the goods the time within which notice of the particulars of the claim can
be given, is void, in so far as it applies to a shipment of a car-load of
potatoes, since the time allowed for making the examination and preferring
the claim is unreasonably short.-SyllabusfromNorth-eastern Reporter.

